JTUCH has been written recently on the 1998 'Wallis reforms' to the Aus-% / 1 tralian financial system. But while they are important, they follow an ear--1-▼ J L lie r period of financial deregulation. Australia started liberalising its fi nancial markets in the 1970s, and the process was essentially completed by 1986.
. For example, liberalisation of private money-market instruments and bank deposit rates left the government little choice but to sell its securities at market prices. Reform sets off snowball effects, and, given the progress in technol ogy, diese are probably even greater today.
F'ifth, die domestic and international financial systems are inextricably linked, and it is difficult to separate reform of the domestic financial system from reform of the capital account. The development of market-priced domestic debt markets, for example, made it more difficult to isolate foreign portfolio investment. In a gradual reform sequence, domestic and international reform occur in tandem.
Expected Benefits of Financial Reform
In their study on the effects of financial liberalisation on OECD economies, Edey and Hviding (1995) argue that liberalisation has provided three general benefits. First, it has improved internal efficiency in banking firms, as shown by declining operating costs and some fall in interest margins. It has improved allocative effi ciency by removing distortions in relative funding costs and providing greater oppor tunities for international portfolio diversification. Finally, it has reduced liquidity constraints and so enabled households to better smooth consumption over time.
From a broad overview, these three gains are evident for Australia. Competi tion in the banking sector, especially for commercial wholesale finance and, more recendy, housing finance, has substantially increased. As a result, average margins in banking have declined moderately, as shown in Figure 1 . Operating expenses have also fallen from about 4 per cent of assets in 1980 to around 3 per cent today. The decline in interest margins on personal loans, however, occurred only in 1996, as loan securitisation became more popular. Competition has had an effect, but it has been slower to take effect than expected.
Liberalisation has also increased allocative efficiency, in the sense diat savers and investors have more choice. Figure 2 shows how the institutional structure of die financial system has changed with deregulation. The bank sector, which was declining under regulation, has expanded, particularly through the entry of new banks. New sectors, particularly those involved with long-term saving, have grown substantially, suggesting that risk diversification has improved.
Liberalisation has greatly affected the ability of firms and households to smooth investment and consumption. For example, there is strong evidence that house holds are now more able to maintain consumption when there are temporary changes in their current income (Debelle & Preston, 1995; de Brouwer, 1996) . Obtaining the benefits for consumption smoothing (and probably investment smoothing) seems to depend on having both a liberalised and an open financial sys tem (de Brouwer, 1996) . The effect of financial liberalisation on investment and consumption smoothing is evident in how the current account and composition of capital flows have altered over time. As shown in Figure 3 , the current account deficit increased in the early 1980s, and the nature of capital flows shifted markedly from direct investment to more 'general purpose' portfolio investment 
Operating Efficiency
The triad of deregulation, liberalisation and internationalisation has had a range of effects on die operation of monetary policy. Reform has enhanced die operating efficiency of monetary policy in a number of ways.
First, in a regulated system, direct controls are applied to die balance sheets of one group of financial institutions, namely, banks. Disintermediation -die expan sion of 11011-bank financial intermediaries and the contracdon of banks -occurred as a result of diese controls, forcing die burden of policy on an ever-smaller part of the financial system, and making monetary policy less effecdve. Dereguladon, liberalisadon and die shift to interest rate-based intervendon changed diis dramadcally: not only were all financial insdtudons affected by policy changes, but the effect was transmitted to the full set of financial prices, including bond yields and share prices.
Moreover, die shift from a 'tap' system for the sale of Commonwealdi govern ment securides (CGS), whereby the government would set die interest rate and the market die quandty, to a tender system also gave the central bank greater control over monetary policy. This enhanced die marketability of CGS at a dme of growing budget deficits, enabling the government to fund its deficit by borrowing from the public and not the central bank. Moreover, since interest rates on CGS tended to be insensidve to movements in market rates, these securides became even less mar ketable, and the reliance on central bank financing even greater, when monetary policy was dghtened. This undermined a tightening of monetary policy. Hence, the shift in auction methods not only secured the independence of monetary policy from fiscal policy, but also boosted its efficiency.
Finally, floating the exchange rate in December 1983 also improved the control of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) over domestic liquidity. As shown in Fig  ure 4 , after the war, Australia fixed its currency to British Sterling and, after deci malisation in 1966, to the US dollar until 1976. From November 1976 to Decem ber 1983, the exchange rate was determined under an adjustable peg system, by which the authorities set the exchange rate each morning and stood ready to clear any imbalances in the foreign exchange market at the end of the day. At times, these imbalances were large and unpredictable, severely undermining management of liquidity. This was remedied by floating die exchange rate. 
Effectiveness
Reform has also enhanced die economic effectiveness of monetary policy.
The Mundell-Fleming framework indicates that, so long as the exchange rate is flexible, a country can pursue an independent monetary policy. In a deregulated economy, monetary policy operates by setdng the short-term interest rate. Since prices are sdeky, changes in the nominal rate imply changes in the real interest rate, which is also the interest rate that most affects economic activity (Gruen, 1994:58-9) . This is the case for Australia. Figure 5 shows that Australian short real interest rates Reform has also opened up new and important channels by which changes in interest rates affect inflation and economic activity. There are at least five channels by which changes in interest rates affect the economy: inter-temporal substitution (the current cost of investment and consumption is affected, altering the decision whether to invest and consume now or later); cash flow (higher interest rates reduce cash flow and current spending); credit supply (higher interest rates change the mix of borrowers seeking loans, making banks more reluctant to lend); other asset ef fects (changes in short-term rates may affect bond yields and share prices); and the exchange rate (higher rates appreciate the exchange rate, lowering import price infla tion, reducing foreign demand for domestic output and shifting domestic demand to foreign output) (Grenville, 1995) . liberalisation was instrumental in opening up these channels. W hen credit was rationed and interest rates fixed, quantitative con trols, and not interest rates, were the fulcrum of monetary policy. In liberalised and open markets, financial prices, and the exchange rate in particular, play a key role in the transmission of monetary policy.
Moreover, the speed with which changes in policy affect output and inflation may be expected to be faster with financial liberalisation. For example, the speed with which changes in money market interest rates are transmitted to bankintermediated deposit and loan rates -and hence affect consumption and invest ment -depends on the degree of regulation and competition in the banking sys tem (Lowe, 1995; de Brouwer, 1995) . As banking has been deregulated and as competition has increased, the speed of transmission of policy may have increased. Similarly, as the exchange rate became more flexible and instrumental as part of the transmission mechanism, it also probably increased the speed with which changes in monetary policy affected output and inflation. The same probably holds true for other financial prices, like bond yields and share prices, which move rapidly when new information arrives. Changes in interest rates, however, do not seem to have affected output more quickly in the 1990s than in the 1980s (Gruen, Romalis & Chandra, 1997) .
Finally, financial reform, particularly floating the exchange rate, has significantly enhanced stabilisation policy and the automatic stabilisers in the economy. This has occurred in three ways. First, given the resource orientation of exports, Austra lia's terms of trade are among the most variable of the developed economies. Un der a fixed exchange rate, a fall in export prices reduces domestic income directly and indirectly through the contraction of liquidity generated as capital inflows ease on die back of lower expected returns and export receipts. Income unambiguously falls. But if the exchange rate is flexible, the currency depreciates in response to a fall in die terms of trade, and this cushions die negadve effect of the terms of trade fall on the traded goods sector. Output is stabilised. Moreover, die infladonary impact of the terms of trade also changes. Under fixed exchange rates, for example, a fall in the terms of trade is disinfladonary, since income is lost and lower capital inflow reduces liquidity. But when the exchange rate is flexible, the income loss is smaller (and could even be a gain if the exchange rate depreciates enough) and the depreciation itself boosts consumer prices since import prices rise in domestic cur-rency terms. A fall in the terms of trade may even be inflationary (Dwyer & Gruen, 1995) .
Second, changes in the real exchange rate are effected by changes in the nomi nal exchange rate or in inflation. W hen the exchange rate is fixed, the inflation rate changes to generate the required real exchange rate adjustment, although adjust ment is slower in this case than a change in the nominal rate since asset prices are much less sticky or persistent than goods and services prices. There is a strong preference for flexibility in the nominal exchange rate because, first, the output costs of achieving a real depreciation can be minimised and, second, high and vari able inflation itself is cosdy.
Third, opening the economy tends to increase competition in goods and serv ices markets, because it usually allows new entrants, and tends to make more mar kets 'traded' as opposed to non-traded. As a consequence, the market power of firms and labour to charge higher prices (in economists' jargon, to extract monop oly rents) falls. For example, as foreign competition becomes more important, domestic firms are forced to take account of the prices of their new competitors. Similarly, if workers set their wage claims too high, profits and sales fall for the firms that employ them, and they lose their jobs. Competition acts as a 'discipline' on bodi firms and workers. This also implies that the nature of 'shocks' may change. The economy, for example, may face fewer 'wages shocks', since wage increases which are not supported by an increase in productivity are likely only to end in more unemployment. Moreover, shocks are more likely to be transitory and just pass through the system if wages are not fully indexed. (One implication of this is that the outcomes associated with a particular monetary policy setting also depend on the institutional structure of the economy.)
Challenges
But reform has also opened up new challenges to policy.
In the first place, the size of, and turnover in, financial markets have expanded substantially, and the prices of financial instruments are affected by the policy inter est rate. Exactly how other financial prices respond depends on the various mar kets' assessment of policy. Changes at the short end of the yield curve can quickly spread to the whole of the yield curve and to related financial returns, like share prices, and hence influence economic activity more rapidly. In this respect, the credibility of the central bank with respect to inflation is crucial. For example, an easing of short-term rates may reduce bond yields if the market considers the cen tral bank to be credible and interprets the action as indicating that inflation is under control. If the central bank's credibility is low, however, bond yields may rise be cause the market thinks the central bank has 'lost the plot'. Markets impose a sub stantial discipline, not just on monetary policy, but also on fiscal, wages and compe tition policy.
In this respect, it is worth noting that, at least for Australia, a floating exchange rate is anything but a 'soft option'. Some commentators argue that fixing the cur rency to that of a low-inflation country is the best way to secure low inflation: float-ing gives policy-makers monetary independence, but it also means that they have the option of choosing higher inflation. This is not the case for Australia, since the markets are a discipline on inflationary policy. As it turns out, Australia's inflation performance after the float is superior to that of before the float: in the ten years before the float in December 1983, annual inflation averaged about 11 per cent, but since then it has averaged 5 per cent (and 2.5 per since 1991).
Second, the expectation that financial reform would give the central bank greater control over the monetary aggregates has not been borne out. Reform and technological change led to major changes in asset demand, rendering the monetary aggregates unstable and targets unattainable. Experimentation with a 'checklist' of indicators also proved unsatisfactory. In the end, left without an intermediate target, the RBA formulated monetary policy with direct reference to the ultimate policy objectives with respect to inflation and activity. This was clarified by the adoption of an inflation target, formally endorsed by the government, of keeping underlying inflation between 2 per cent and 3 per cent on average over the cycle. Since it takes between one and two years for a change in policy to have its full effect on employ ment and inflation, policy has to be forward-looking.
Third, as a number of OECD countries, including Australia, experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, die adjustment to financial deregulation was associated widi asset price bubbles and a deterioration in the quality of bank assets. In Austra lia's case, easier access to funds, and intense competition between die banks for new business, generated an expansion of credit for investment, pardcularly in commer cial property. This was amplified by rising asset values which boosted collateral and stimulated furdier expansion of bank loans and corporate balance sheets. Credit standards, on the whole, were loosened. When die economy slowed down and die bubble burst, non-performing loans severely eroded die profitability of die banking system, and left many firms over-leveraged. The recovery was delayed because in stitutions had to repair their balance sheets (Lowe, 1994; Mills, Morling & Tease, 1994) . There are two implications for policy. First, die excesses of die late 1980s were part of a learning process by commercial bankers, firms and bank supervisors, and are not intrinsic to deregulation itself (Lowe, 1994; RBA, 1996:52) . (Whedier odier countries have gained this insight vicariously, however, is an open question.) Second, proper credit and market risk systems need to be in place when finance is liberalised. Crucial elements of diis are that commercial bank officers have suffi cient expertise to assess, monitor and control risk; that banks have adequate condngency reserves; and that bank auditors and supervisors ensure that minimum standards are clear and eflfecdve systems in place and enforced. Advances along this line in Australia include the introduction of on-site bank examinadons and the focus on managing market risk, rather than just credit risk. The Financial System Inquiry (1997) also recommended strengthening the surveillance of financial inter mediaries by combining existing supervisory institutions into one.
The fourth broad challenge is to understand financial markets. This centres on two related issues. The first is that financial prices and capital flows sometimes seem to be excessively volatile, making policy formation difficult The second is that market reactions sometimes seem 'excessive'. It has been well documented, for example, that financial markets can be too focused on the short term, too sensi tive to new information, or too caught up in fads that drive financial ^prices away from die economic fundamentals which are diought to lie behind them. This may be, in part, because they sometimes follow risk-management techniques or trading rules -like charting, technical analysis, program trading, stop-loss orders and dy namic hedging techniques -that are not necessarily related to macroeconomic fundamentals (Argy, 1996) .
Consider, first, volatility in financial prices, and the exchange rate in particular. While volatility in OECD currencies has been greater after the collapse of the Bret ton W oods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971, Edey and Hviding (1995) point out that trend volatility has not increased in this period, even if there are particular episodes of substantial volatility. Gruen (1994) shows that volatility in Australia has been similar to that in other countries. On the economic effects of volatility, how ever, die literature is mixed, and the issue remains open. But in relation to Austra lia, a first glance at the data suggests diat variability in output has not increased over the past few decades (Gruen, 1994) , aldiough this observadon does not take account of the effect of other shocks, like oil price rises, that occurred in earlier decades.
Volatility in capital flows is something that policy-makers have grappled with for decades. In the 1970s, capital controls were applied and removed a number of times in response to the strengdi of capital inflows. The need to use controls de pended largely on how fixed die exchange rate was. As die currency became more flexible, notably in die shift from a fixed to pegged (or semi-fixed) rate in 1976, die need to impose controls fell. The pegged rate system, however, still provided speculators with a one-way bet against the central bank -and ultimately taxpayers -and itself induced highly destabilising capital flows. For example, as indicated in Figure 7 , in February 1983 the market expected a devaluation of die Australian dollar, sold the currency and bought foreign exchange, leading to a fall in reserves and inducing a devaluadon. In December of that year, the market expected a re valuation and started to buy Australian dollars. The government floated die dollar, forcing speculators to speculate against themselves. In die process, the authorities gained control over liquidity.
As discussed above, a flexible exchange rate provides clear benefits to a small open economy like Australia. Moreover, a country with substantial resource en dowments but small population and limited domestic capital like Australia will also be highly dependent on foreign capital. The best way to ensure stability in capital A further issue is the difficult question of whether financial prices reflect fun damentals. This involves, first, a judgment about what fundamentals are. Take die real exchange rate, for example. The fundamental determinants of die Australian real exchange rate are commonly regarded as being die terms of trade, real interest differentials, net foreign liabilities and, perhaps, fiscal policy (Blundell-Wignall et ah, 1994; Tardid, 1996) . Given reladonships based on past average responses, it is possible to form some view of die 'fundamental' value of die currency. These judgments are not precise, since they are based on estimates and die effect on the fundamental value depends on die permanence of die shock. Central banks also form a view on whether movements in bond prices and yields reflect changes in fundamentals, such as expected inflation or die global demand for and supply of capital, or are due to 'market dynamics'.
But die issue is more complicated. An event described as market-driven may, in fact, be a failure of policy itself; the market may simply have been doing its job. Or diere may be elements of both forces: a fundamental need for policy adjust- This is reflected in the real exchange rate. ment exacerbated by market over-reaction to the situation. The 1992 European and the 1994 Mexican exchange rate crises may be examples. German reunifica tion, for example, was tantamount to a major negative supply shock and positive demand shock for Germany. The only way to contain incipient inflation and the sharp increase in demand for capital was to raise local interest rates and allow a real revaluation of the German mark. But nominal revaluation was not possible within the framework of fixed exchange rates in the European Monetary System, and so all countries in the system were bound to undergo rising interest rates at a time when demand in their economies was weak. For some countries, like the United King dom, Italy and Spain, this was not a credible policy given their domestic circum stances, and markets reacted accordingly. The Mexican crisis of 1994 occurred against a backdrop of rapid accumulation of short-term US dollar-denominated li abilities, without a build-up of foreign exchange reserves, but with a marked deterio ration in Mexico's fiscal position and increased political uncertainty (IMF, 1995:90-7) . Again, markets were reacting to a situation they saw as unsustainable. The story of East Asia in 1997 is likely to have similar elements.
More difficult, however, is what to do if there is a market misalignment or clear over-reaction. If a market correction is imminent, or the misalignment small, then no special response may be required. But if the misalignment is judged to be large and persistent, or market reaction to some event excessive, then some policy re sponse may be appropriate. A number of responses to these sorts of events are possible:
• persuasion, through speeches and written assessments of die economy and fi nancial markets. A central bank might indicate at times diat it regards the reac tion in particular financial markets to have been excessive;
• sterilised intervention in die foreign exchange market to signal that the central bank judges that market's response to be excessive. While sterilised intervendon does not change the liquidity in the system (it merely changes the composidon of central bank assets), it can influence die market's expectadons and provide sta bility to die exchange rate in periods of uncertainty. In Australia, intervendon was significandy used in die second half of the 1980s when the market was fairly unsetded, pardcularly following the 'banana republic' comment by the dien Treasurer in mid-1986, and the strong appreciadon of the Australian dollar in February 1989 (when die Australian dollar reached US$0.90) (Campbell, 1995) ; and
• use o f short-term interest rates to influence capital llows. This is a feature of monetary policy decision-making in a number of countries where the exchange rate is an important focus of policy. In Australia, monetary policy is primarily focused on internal objeedves. An example of die use of interest rates to influ ence capital flows was in mid-1986, when short-term interest rates were increased to resist die depreciadon of the exchange rate (Lowe, 1994:167-8) .
Conclusion
Financial deregulation, liberalisation and internationalisation have had pervasive effects on the economy. This triad of reform has brought many benefits, particu larly in terms of financial market efficiency and macroeconomic stabilisation. For example, interest margins have narrowed, portfolios have expanded, and firms and households have found it easier to 'smooth' their spending. Moreover, the floating exchange rate has reduced the impact of real external shocks on output and infla tion. But reform has also raised some new challenges for policy-makers, including greater discipline on monetary and fiscal policies and the need to keep watch on stability in financial markets and in the banking system.
Appendix

Chronology of Financial Reform in Australia
At die start of 1970, in regard to the domestic financial market, quantitaiive controls were applied to bank lending, general controls on the products banks could offer, and interest rate controls on both deposits and loans. Banks were licensed either as trading banks or as savings banks. In 1968, banks were allowed to offer lease fi nancing beyond overdraft limits, and in 1969 trading banks were allowed to issue certificates of deposit and savings banks allowed to offer investment accounts (both subject to prescriptions). In regard to the capital account, all international transactions were subject to exchange control approval by the RBA. The only laws affecting foreign investment in Australia were in the areas of banking, civil aviation, radio and television. The most acceptable forms of investment were those which contributed to development, introduced new technology or products, established new operations, or included some local equity or management Investment judged to be speculative or subvert ing local control was discouraged. Australian investment abroad was virtually em bargoed, with approval granted only in exceptional circumstances. Direct invest ment abroad was allowed if it promoted export markets or served to protect or ex pand an existing interest. J u n e 78 G e n e ra l relax atio n in foreign in v e s tm e n t policy, including su s p e n d All re stric tio n s on A ustralian in v e s tm e n t o v e r s e a s in e q u itie s a n d real e s t a t e r e m o v ed (alth o u g h foreign e x c h a n g e a p p ro v al from th e RBA w a s still required). J u n e 8 2 RBA c e a s e s q u a n titativ e lending gu id a n c e . A ug 82 P re s c rib e d a s s e t ratio re p la c e d by a m u ch low er r e s e r v e s a s s e t ratio. M ay 8 3
Major financial reforms in
In te re st p aid to n o n -re s id e n ts by A u s tra lian s s u b je c t to a w ithholding tax. D ec 8 3 A u stralian dollar flo ated a n d m o s t e x c h a n g e c o n tro ls a b o lish e d . Aug 8 4
All rem a in in g c o n tro ls o n th e te rm s a n d c o n d itio n s of b a n k d e p o s its rem o v ed ; sa v in g s b a n k s allow ed to offer c h e q u eing facilities. J a n 85 S o m e re stric tio n s relating to foreign in v e s tm e n t in A u stralian s e c u ritie s lifted, allow ing foreign g o v e rn m e n t a g e n c ie s a n d foreign b a n k s , o th e r th a n c en tral b a n k s, to in v est in A u stralian se c u ritie s. F e b 85 E ntry of 16 foreign b a n k s April 85 R e m a in in g ceilin g s on in te re s t ra te s re m o v e d , e x c e p t for o w n e r-o cc u p ied h o u sin g lo a n s u n d e r A $10 0 ,0 0 0 . S e p t 85 E s ta b lish m e n t of 4 5 n e w m e rc h a n t b a n k s, a n d 19 p ro p o s a ls for restru ctu rin g of e x ist ing m e rc h a n t b a n k s, a p p ro v ed . O c t 85 S ignificant relax atio n in existing p ro c e d u re s for s c re e n in g foreign in v e s tm e n t p ro p o sa ls.
April 86
In te re st r a te ceiling on n e w ow nero c c u p ie d h o u sin g lo a n s re m o v e d , e x is t ing lo a n s still s u b je c t to m axim um ra te of 13.5 p e r c e n t. Ju ly 86 R em o v al of e x e m p tio n s from in te re s t with holding ta x o n A u stralian se c u ritie s, but policy re v e rse d ; foreign in v e s tm e n t in m a n u fa ctu rin g a n d real e s ta te g u id elin es relax ed . April 8 7 F o reign ta k e o v e r g u id elin es relax ed . S e p t 88 R e s e r v e s a s s e t ratio re p la c e d by p rim e a s s e t ratio, b y w hich 10 p e r c e n t of li abilities (excluding s h a r e h o ld e r s ' fu n d s) re q u ire d to b e h eld in p rim e a s s e t s , like c a s h o r g o v e rn m e n t s e c u ritie s . J a n 9 0 D istinction b e tw e e n trad in g a n d s a v in g s b a n k s re m o v e d . F e b 92 F u rth e r e n try by foreign b a n k s a p p ro v e d . 
